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In this paper we extend previous reviews of the social capital literature to encompass 
an ethics perspective. First, we update previous reviews of social capital. Social 
capital continues to gain currency in both academic and practical circles, despite 
relatively little critical reflection on the implications of promoting this popular 
concept. Our work goes some way to rectifying this paucity in understanding what has 
been termed the ‗dark side‘ of social capital. In particular, we review the social capital 
concept from the perspective of three theories of business ethics: utilitarianism, justice 
and ethic of care. While the utilitarian perspective closely parallels accounts of social 
capital‘s rationale, the concept‘s operation is mirrored very closely by the 
assumptions underpinning the ethic of care, while the dark side of social capital is 
commonly given voice in justice-based critiques. We conclude by considering the 
implications of our analysis.  
 Introduction 
 
Social capital – ―understood roughly as the goodwill that is engendered by the fabric 
of social relations and that can be mobilized to facilitate action‖ (Adler and Kwon 
2002, 17) – is a concept predicated on societal actors‘ propensity to develop 
relationships with one another. If we judge the success of a concept by its adoption 
across different scholarly disciplines, then the social capital concept is triumphant. It 
has been adopted by those engaged with political science, development studies, 
sociology, organization theory and management.  
 
Since Adler and Kwon (2002) have fairly recently reviewed social capital from a 
management perspective in general terms, it is not our purpose to repeat that here. 
Instead we build on and develop their work by updating the literature review of social 
capital, and reviewing it from an ethics perspective. Ethics has largely been missing 
from previous reviews of social capital. This is necessary because scholars and policy 
makers alike should be aware of the full implications of promoting social capital both 
as an analytical tool in researching organisations and as a mechanism for improving 
management and policy effectiveness.  
 
This ethical review considers the positive outcomes of social capital, but it 
particularly concerns itself with the potential negative outcomes of inequality, 
privilege and loss of freedom that social capital can cause, and the impact of these on 
the ‗optimum economic‘ outcomes idealised in the social capital literature.  Edwards 
and Foley (1998, 131) suggest that Coleman (e.g. 1988) perceives social capital to be 
a ―morally and ethically neutral resource that facilitates all manner of individual and 
collective endeavours‖. As our review shows, not all forms, manifestations and 
outcomes of social capital are morally right. Some aspirations for social capital are 
not based on morally good intentions; the enactment of social capital can be 
exclusionary, and further, there are a number of unethical consequences of social 
capital.   
 
Our analysis of the literature points clearly in the direction of two distinct ethical 
paradigms – utilitarianism on the one hand, which stresses acting for the common 
good and maximizing good outcomes over bad, and ethic of care, sometimes known 
as ethic of responsibilities or duties, on the other, which sees ethical conflicts not in 
instrumental outcome-based terms, but instead as conflicts of duties in relationships 
not always geared towards rational utility maximizing homo economicus. Put in 
simple terms, utilitarianism stresses rational outcomes – the ‗capital‘ element if you 
like of social capital; ethic of care, on the other, alerts us to the ‗social‘ element of 
social capital. Further, criticisms over the ‗excess of bonding capital‘ (Coleman 1988) 
in certain environments and situations, made visible through inequality and exclusion, 
fall very firmly under the ethical gaze of justice. Justice operates according to the key 
principles of equal rights and the most extensive system of basic liberties being open 
to all, with social and economic equalities arranged so that they are to everyone‘s 
advantage and available to all.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. First we summarise the definitions and 
characteristics of social capital according to key literature. Then we take a closer look 
at the espoused advantages of social capital, and follow this with a review of the work 
that has addressed the negative aspects, or what might be called the ‗dark side‘ of 
social capital.  The next section sets out the central components of the three relevant 
ethical theories and we apply them in detail to some examples of the dark side of 
social capital identified in the literature. We conclude that by looking at the social 
capital literature through an ethical lens, the bias and ethical underpinnings in the 
extant literature are highlighted, to enable management researchers to engage with 
this undeniably useful concept in a more balanced and ultimately meaningful way.  
 
The characteristics of social capital 
There are many definitions of social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Paldam 2000). 
Robert Putnam‘s key definition is that ―social capital refers to connections among 
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that 
arise from them‖ (Putnam 2000, 19). Adler and Kwon, in their definition, recognise 
that these networks and norms become ―the goodwill available to individuals and 
groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor‘s social relations. Its 
effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the 
actor‖ (2002, 23).  
 
Putnam distinguishes between two types of social capital – bonding and bridging – a 
distinction that has been popular in the literature to understand different forms of 
social capital. Where a group associates and identifies with fellow members of the 
same group, this is called bonding social capital. There is a strong emphasis on 
internal group norms, attitudes and sanctions that govern the proper expectations and 
behaviours of participants. As a result, in-group loyalty is maintained and specific 
identities reinforced (Field 2003, 32). According to Putnam, ―Bonding social capital is 
good for under-girding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity‖ (2000, 22). This 
type of social capital may come from a feeling of needing to react to (negative) 
external forces: ―Social capital is often most easily created in opposition to something 
or someone else‖ (Putnam 2000, 360-361).  
 
Adler and Kwon contrast this approach focusing on collective actors‘ internal 
linkages and close bonds with the concept of bridging social capital, which they view 
as focusing on a focal actor or group‘s external relations with other actors or groups.  
On this view, social capital becomes a ―resource that inheres in the social network 
tying a focal actor to other actors‖ (2002, 19). Bridging social capital, then, is 
inclusive and concentrates on bringing together people from different backgrounds 
and perspectives: ―Bridging networks…are better for linkage to external assets and 
for information diffusion‖ (Putnam 2000, 22). He explains the distinction between the 
two types thus: ―Bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, 
whereas bridging capital provides a sociological WD-40.‖ (Putnam 1995, 23).1  
 
The bonding-bridging distinction is a point of debate; the two forms of capital may 
not be necessarily mutually exclusive (Putnam 2000, 23), nor are they always helpful 
for understanding the concept (Adler and Kwon 2002, 35). Some authors are strongly 
in favour of this separation, for example, Newell, Tansley and Huang (2004) argue for 
the separate treatment of bridging and bonding social capital, since for example, 
bonding social capital may be a prerequisite in a team for effective group benefit from 
                                               
1  Scholars have adopted and adapted this division in a variety of ways. For example, Portes (1998) 
stratifies the literature into ‗consummatory‘ and ‗instrumental‘ social capital. Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998) have developed and applied the concept towards an evaluation of its functioning in 
organizational and business life. The bonding-bridging division can be detected behind their 
conceptualization of social capital in business existing in three dimensions: structural, cognitive and 
relational.   
bridging social capital. On the other hand, Adler and Kwon point out that some 
conceptualisations are neutral to this ‗divide‘ (2002, 21). A good example is Gray et 
al. (2007), who suggest this is a spectrum rather than a divide per se. They formulate 
this as a debate over ‗open‘ or ‗closed‘ networks (Coleman 1990), and draw on 
Coleman‘s example of diamond traders in New York who have such a strong informal 
system of norms and sanctions that high levels of trust are possible (ie this is a closed 
network), in comparison to, for example, Burt‘s (1997) brokering between distinct 
groups which are still open and benefit from information diffusion as a consequence. 
In this article, we recognise the bonding-bridging distinction as instructive for an 
understanding of how the ethical frameworks that underpin discussions and debate of 
the social capital concept can best be applied. 
 
The advantages of social capital  
 
The thrust of much of the social capital literature is generally positive (see for 
example Leana and Van Buren 1999). Social capital at the societal level is seen to 
deliver positive economic and political outcomes, based on the existence of intangible 
collective resources such as local solidarity, common norms and trusting 
communities, better mental health and education, plus reduced crime (Putnam 2000), 
―i.e. a wide range of durable, socio-economic, collective goods, which in all respects 
are vital to people, form an important part of their everyday lives and clearly enhance 
their well-being.‖ (Svendsen and Sorensen 2006, 425) Crucially, ―[u]nlike other 
forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structures between actors and among 
actors.‖ (Coleman 1988, 20) 
 The management literature has been quick to spot the application of the social capital 
concept to business practices, with recent empirical work exploring social capital 
across a wide range of organizations and organizational practices. Studies have 
covered, for example, human resource development practices, internal organizational 
processes, the interconnectedness of human and social capital and its role in 
exchange relationships and strategic alliances (Edelman et al. 2004; Halpern 2004, 
43-72). Others have investigated the role of social capital in innovation (e.g. 
Fountain 1998; Maskell 2000), knowledge management and the knowledge economy 
(e.g. Maskell et al. 1998; Lang 2004; McElroy et al. 2006) and workplace 
discrimination (e.g. Gray et al. 2007).  
 
Inherent in social capital is the notion that such capital built along one trajectory is 
appropriated for a different cause. Social capital‘s appropriability (Coleman 1988, 
109), or ‗appropriable‘ organisation (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, 253) could be in 
evidence when, for example, a garage owner takes a car to a neighbouring firm for a 
test and, while there, gets into discussion on a technical problem he is having with a 
repair and ends up borrowing equipment or simply learning information which helps 
solve the problem unrelated to the initial visit. Indeed, the ‗problem‘ need not be 
business related and could be a social or personal issue such as which school to send a 
child to or what to buy a partner for an anniversary (Spence and Schmidpeter 2003).  
 
Ostrom notes that: ―Success in starting small-scale institutions enables a group of 
individuals to build on the social capital thus created to solve larger problems and 
more complex institutional arrangements (1990, 190). Hence an initial reservoir of 
social capital is a foundation for multifaceted activities and may lead to strengthened 
and broadened social capital potentially with a wider circle of partners. People often 
think of their social network in economic terms, as an ‗investment‘. This common 
attitude nicely captures the appropriability and convertibility of social capital. The 
capital invested in social networks can be appropriated at a later time, for numerous 
purposes, and it can be converted into others forms of capital.   
 
Summarising the general thrust of these arguments, Burt argues that advantages 
created in social structure; that is, in informal relations, are becoming increasingly 
important as, ‗…markets, organizations, and careers become more and more 
dependent on informal, discretionary relationships.‘ (2005, sleeve notes) 
 
What the dark side looks like 
 
Most theories of social capital stress the positive externalities of social connections 
and informal relationships which are theorised to result in trust, shared norms, 
solidarity, and civic mindedness. As Field (2003, 71) observes: ―there shines out a 
warm glow. Social capital‘s ‗dark side‘, by contrast, remains largely unknown 
terrain.‖  However, a good number of authors acknowledge the downsides to social 
capital – systematic critiques of social capital include those by Edelman et al. (2004), 
Locke (1999), Leenders and Gabbay (1999) and Portes (1998). Portes (1998, 15) 
summarises problematic aspects as being ‗at least‘ the exclusion of others, excessive 
claims on members of the group, restrictions on individual freedoms, group closure 
and the downward levelling of norms based on group solidarity. Other related 
outcomes include distrust and lack of cooperation, thereby impeding economic 
progress. 
 
Putnam does in fact recognise the potential limitations of the emphasis on shared 
norms, languages and networks, when he cautions over the ‗Dark Side of Social 
Capital‘ (2000, 350-363) and concedes that there is a ―...classic liberal objection to 
community ties: community restricts freedom and encourages intolerance.‖ (Ibid, 
351) For example, in the 1950s a, ―…surfeit of social capital seemed to impose 
conformity and social division‖ (Ibid, 352). This dark side is given voice in ―a 
collection of criticisms that interpret Putnam‘s social capital as class based, and elitist 
for providing a bulwark in favour of the prevailing economic policies‖  (Manning 
2008, 55). 
 
This can apply as much in the perpetuation of elites or key groups in the work place 
as in wider society, and is reminiscent of Bourdieu‘s (1986) conceptualisation of 
social capital as relating to ―privileged individuals (who) maintain their position by 
using their connections with other privileged people‖ (cited in Field 2003, 28). Based 
on this, it is easy to spot the potential moral deficiencies of social capital in simple 
statements such as those of Lin, defining social capital as, ―embedded resources in the 
networks accessed and used to attain status.‖(Lin 2001, 79) Social capital is premised 
on ―investment in social relations with expected returns in the market place‖ (Ibid, 
19), or put simply: ‗It‘s not just what you know but who you know.‘ (Lin 2001, 40)   
 
In the business context, the ‗not what you know but who you know‘ dark side can be 
found in Stevenson and Greenberg‘s (2000, 652) comments that: ―some actors are 
enabled by their network position, and others are constrained‖, ie there is no 
guarantee that the enabled individuals are necessarily the best. When it comes to, for 
example, knowledge-sharing, social capital, through its focus on a limited group of 
network ‗insiders‘ and by extension organizational ‗subgroups‘, may hinder 
intrapreneurship and impose non-reciprocal obligations that lead to the organisation 
favouring the subgroup goals over the goals of the larger organization (Adler and 
Kwon 2002; Locke 1999; cited in Willem and Scarbrough 2006). On a broader 
business level, cartelisation and business friendships may lead to obligations to help 
each other and opportunities for collaboration (Adler and Kwon 2002), however they 
may also lead to lower productivity, higher prices, non-responsiveness to customer 
needs, lack of enterprise, stagnation and inefficiency (Ingram and Roberts 2000; Field 
2003; Adler and Kwon 2002). At a societal level, a commonly quoted example 
develops this possibility into a basis for social exclusion: Puerto Rican drug dealers in 
New York, it is claimed, do everything to keep one another within the drug milieu, to 
the extent that it would be treason to mix with the whites in an attempt at social 
upward mobility (Portes 1998, 17).  
 
The common theme is that when social capital takes place within a well-delineated 
and close-knit group, the resulting bonds can operate such that outside influences are 
excluded and damaging group norms enforced (Johnston and Percy-Smith 2002), 
resulting in an aggregate loss for those inside the network and potentially the wider 
organization and/or society. In terms of the foregoing debate over the bonding-
bridging divide, this is an example of Coleman‘s ‗excess of bonding social capital‘.  
 
To sum up the arguments regarding social capital‘s ‗dark side‘, this, then, is a case in 
which some economic actors have social capital that is more useful than others, it is a 
resource that can be subject to high levels of selectivity and manipulation by actors 
using it and those subject to it, and this can lead to great inequalities and perverse 
outcomes in the attainment of optimum ‗economic outcomes‘. Such concerns lead 
Adler and Kwon to conclude that: ―social capital research would benefit from a more 
systematic assessment of risks as well as benefits… One actor's social capital 
advantage is often another actor's disadvantage, and research on the differential access 
to social capital is therefore a high priority (Lin 1999)‖ (2002, 35). 
 
Ethical theory and social capital 
 
In this section we demonstrate the implicit reference to ethical theory in the social 
capital literature, and how certain moral arguments are sometimes unwittingly 





Social capital as a form of capital is viewed as a productive asset or a resource to 
pursue and achieve maximum utility and/or profit for a society or business 
organization. Such a conceptualization resonates directly with the ethical theory of 
utilitarianism, a consequentialist theory which stresses the achievement of the long-
term maximum utility for society as a whole, evaluating the moral worth of an action 
according to the results flowing from it (Knights and O‘Leary 2006). First developed 
through the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the principle of utility 
refers to the ethical goal of promoting overall welfare. In simple terms, this is often 
presented as a cost-benefit analysis according to which an action is morally right if it 
leads to the greatest good for the greatest number (the greatest happiness principle) 
and minimises harm (Beauchamp and Bowie 2004).  
 
Of course, in a situation where it is the aggregate utility that counts, one person‘s 
increase of utility may be offset by a reduction in that of another. As a result, 
utilitarianism is disadvantaged by the difficulty of allowing some to suffer because of 
the moral imperative of achieving the greatest good for the greatest number. In 
business ethics, the concept of utility is a popular model that has a wide application, 
which overlaps to a certain extent with the economic principle that is called, not 
coincidentally, utility maximisation. Indeed, in relation to its utilitarian 
underpinnings, social capital as a concept has been criticised by McCleneghan (2003, 
437) as representing, through the work of Coleman (1988), Granovetter (1992), Portes 
(1995) and Woolcock (2000): ―an early incursion by neoclassical economics into 
sociological thought through rational choice theory, extended and developed through 
network theory‖. There is a clear use of utilitarian language in her account of how, in 
this process, the ‗social‘ element of social capital has become subordinated ―to a 
particular form of economic theorising. Everything, including relations of conflict, 
can now be viewed as forms of capital which when they favour particularistic 
interests over the general good are understood in terms of the concept‘s ‗dark side‘.‖ 
(McCleneghan 2003, 437) 
 
Social capital‘s dark side, then, considers the mechanisms by which the common 
good, as promoted through the utilitarian assumptions underlying the ‗warm glow‘ 
rhetoric surrounding the outcomes of the concept, is subverted through the inherent 
risks of particularistic interests prevailing, i.e. the costs then come to outweigh the 
benefits. 
 
Utilitarianism and social capital 
 
How is this manifested in practice? Social capital in its optimal form provides benefits 
for the ‗broader aggregate‘, ideally becoming ‗collective goods‘ rather than the 
private property of the focal group who created and initially sought to benefit from it 
(Adler and Kwon 2002; Coleman 1988), through the provision of, for example, macro 
economic and political benefits, a competitive and innovative businesses 
environment, trusting communities, improved health and education and so on, that all 
go to improve individual and societal well-being. From a utilitarian perspective, 
‗pure‘ public goods (Adler and Kwon 2002, 32) should not exclude ‗outsiders‘ from 
the benefits developed and accrued by the insiders, nor should this apply in the 
reverse: ―Depending on the content of its norms and beliefs, a group with strong 
internal ties but only few external ties may become insular and xenophobic or, 
alternatively, may use its internal social capital to encourage and help its members 
reach out to the surrounding world‖. And by implication, the external world benefits 
in this latter process too.  
 
However, the risks of the negative (perhaps unintended) externalities of bonding 
social capital in the form of, for example, exclusivity and overembeddedness, the 
exercise of power, and blocks on innovation resulting in anti-competitiveness, among 
many others, are much in evidence in the social capital literature. For example, 
Portes‘ (1998) observes that tightly-knit communities may suffer free-riders who 
demand resources from the group or community, or indeed may discourage members 
from reaching out economically or culturally to the wider society. Similarly, extended 
families who share resources may lead to redundancy of effort by some, and extreme 
hard work by others. In both cases, entrepreneurial activity and greater economic 
returns are much reduced; individual good, let alone the common good, is not 
achieved. 
 
From the business perspective, there is much discussion of the impact of social capital 
on managerial success, and on knowledge-sharing, competition, and innovation, 
amongst others – the utilitarian benefit of a profitable and competitive firm is 
assumed to be better achieved through such processes. For managers, social capital is 
seen as a source of power, influence and control particularly for those already 
occupying or wishing to achieve a powerful place in the social network (see Burt 
1997) – so-called ‗gatekeepers‘ who initially set up their networks for their own aims 
and benefits (e.g. career development). As they increase their power, their knowledge 
garners increased value as a result of their social capital activities and resultant 
position in the network – they set the frames of reference, norms and key individuals 
for their business and those around it – leading to enhanced knowledge-sharing, 
which in turn becomes a collective good available to those outside of the network. 
These key network players‘ social capital is more effective than formal relationships 
at mobilizing knowledge in organizations (Kostava and Roth 2003, cited in Willem 
and Scarbrough 2006).  
 However, such an exercise of power may not achieve greatest happiness for the 
organization and its stakeholders, and indeed has the potential to undermine 
organisational effectiveness and performance. Unless such managers exercise their 
power ‗virtuously‘ towards organizational rather than personal gain (Adler and Kwon 
2002), there is every possibility they may direct others towards a selective form of 
knowledge-sharing or withholding (Edelman et al. 2004). The networking manager 
described above is instrumentally seeking career success and increased power, and so 
may be sorely tempted to make changes in what constitutes acceptable or correct 
knowledge in an organization, or the appropriate ways and routines of doing things 
(Lawrence et al. 2005, in Willem and Scarbrough 2006) that meet their own needs. 
Such managers or groups of managers or even organizations may seek to maintain 
their dominant position through setting norms and narratives that ―exclude 
subordinate categories from the information, influence, and solidarity benefits it has 
already accrued. There is no invisible hand that assures that the use of social capital 
resources in competition among actors will generate an optimal outcome for the 
broader aggregate‖ (Adler and Kwon 2002, 31). The greatest happiness of 
stakeholders is far from guaranteed.  
 
Knowledge and knowledge-sharing has been a popular focus of attention for the 
application of social capital theory to business. Social capital is seen to create mutual 
understanding, and the right conditions to exchange knowledge, perhaps even 
intensively. With greater knowledge-sharing amongst sub-groups and members of 
organizations, organizational performance and profitability are improved (Gargiulo 
and Bernassi 2000; Tsai 2000; cited in Willem and Scarbrough 2006). However, the 
utilitarian benefit of firm profitability can be threatened when innovation and 
entrepreneurship are thwarted through these processes, i.e. it is possible that there is 
over-reliance on the strong ties associated with dense networks of social capital and 
their resultant obligations (Granovetter 1973). The very norms and group 
identification that have the potential to increase organizational or group performance 
can, dependent on the focal actor, and the attendant network and assumptions of it, 
create barriers to new ideas entering the group, resulting in parochialism and inertia 
(Gargiulo and Bernassi 1999 in Adler and Kwon 2002).  
 
The undesirable consequence of social capital leading to a poor innovative 
environment and sub-optimal business outcomes have been investigated by, for 
example, Maskell et al. (1998, cited in Field (2003), who found evidence in the 
Nordic countries that social capital, while having the potential to stimulate knowledge 
transfer and business innovation also created a ―risk of ‗lock-in‘ to existing strategies 
and techniques. In this case, employers find they are pushed into holding on to an 
activity long after it has ceased to have economic value (Maskell et al. 1998, 49, in 
Field 2003, 86). In a similar vein, Kern (1998), commented on German industry that 
the price of too much inter-firm trust in the country was a loss of radical innovation – 
firms neither sought nor adopted new ideas on account of their loyalty to established 
suppliers (Adler and Kwon 2002, 30).   
 
Unintended consequences are also examined by Ayios (2003, 2004) and Ledeneva 
(1998, cited in Field 2002). Ayios notes how the blat system in Russia of exchanging 
favours for necessary, scarce items or services impacts negatively on the entry of 
western investors in the former Soviet states who struggle to master what she labels 
‗local competence‘ – i.e. a post-Soviet version of the old boys‘ network. Ledeneva‘s 
(1998) research indicates that in the minds of the blat perpetuators, there is a loss to 
unknown others from whom they objectively distance themselves in consequential 
terms, while those engaging in the exchange gained. Further, Portes (1998, 15) cites 
examples where a particular group becomes dominant and flourishes in a given 
industry, such as the construction industry in a city, and in doing so excludes others 
from having the same opportunity.  
 
Strong ties might limit innovation but enhance other positive outcomes (e.g. 
psychological well being of participants) so that, overall, utility gains are still 
positive. Granovetter‘s (1973) strong and weak ties have been identified in the case of 
entrepreneurs who use different social circles to solve different problems (Cohen and 
Fields 1999; Flap et al. 2000, 153). In their work focussing on the social capital of 
ethnic entrepreneurs mainly in the Netherlands, Flap et al. (2000, 153-158) note that 
starting up a business as an ethnic entrepreneur can be hampered by limited collateral, 
discrimination by banks and a distrust of bureaucratic agencies. Money is often 
borrowed from several family members and friends. A balance of positive outcomes 
is achieved through entrepreneurship being enabled via these processes of social 
capital. However, the motivation for making these contributions may be to do with 
upholding a status position, which can be highly embedded in a local immigrant 
community. In turn, the recipient also cannot risk losing face, and is bound to repay 
the money quickly, making it difficult to develop the business on a sound financial 
footing. Friends and family may be hired as employees, which has the advantage of 
reducing turnover, but they cannot be pressed as hard as other employees. In a study 
of South Asians in the West Midlands, Ram and Jones found that family members 
actually put up resistance to bringing in external help when needed (Ram and Jones 
2002, 164). Furthermore, as customers, friends and family may expect special rates; 
the research by Flap et al. (2000, 156) indicates that some cultures may consider it 
inappropriate to make profit from the in-group but fair game from people in the out-
group. Again, achievement of the greatest happiness is threatened. 
 
The above discussion has shown how the ethical lens of utilitarianism can be 
instructive in understanding the potential moral deficiencies of the ‗capital‘ element 
of social capital, and draws our attention to the risks of its perceived benefit-
maximising rationale.  It also paves the way for grasping how the ethic of care 
underpins notions of the operation of social capital‘s ‗social‘ element.  
 
Care, justice and social capital 
 
Brady (1985, 24) comments that ―utilitarianism as a system of public decision-making 
tends to suppress the expression of sympathy and other felt obligations... Any 
obligations or feelings of intrinsic worth, apart from human self-interest, are 
comparatively unimportant.‖ Homo economicus is beholden to act rationally, 
instrumentally, motivated by extrinisic rewards, and acting in isolation from others. 
Liedtka suggests that it is the shortcomings of this approach that has led to the 
―language of care and relationship-building …[appearing]… with prominence in the 
business literature, driven by the realities of the marketplace‖ (1996, 179). These 
‗realities‘ now reside in a realisation that traditional views of capital overlook the 
central role of economic actors interacting and organising themselves in such a way as 
to create economic growth and development (World Bank (1998), in Hibbitt et al. 
2001). Indeed, social capital is ―seldom defined so as to include feelings or emotions. 
Yet it is feelings of empathy and concern for others-developed through contact and 
interaction with them-that provide crucial reinforcement for trust and cooperation" 
(Folbre 2001, cited in Schmid 2002, 751).  
 
While an ethic of care prioritises the maintenance and nurturance of ongoing 
responsibilities and relationships, the ethic of justice emphasizes individual 
autonomy, choice and freedom, ensured through the preservation of equality, and 
enacted through rules that must be followed by all to ensure fairness. Relationships in 
this context are established through respect for others‘ rights and the observance of 
the attached obligations, established through the ‗highest principles‘ (French and 
Weis 2000; Sevenhuijsen 2000; Reiter 1997). Therefore, an ethic of care perspective 
is linked, as a result, to ‗negative freedom‘, in the sense of standing in the way of a 
free or autonomous life (Giddens 1998, cited in Sevenhuijsen 2000). Social capital, 
seen through this lens, has been criticised on the grounds of exclusion, restricting 
freedom, perpetuating privilege, creating intolerance, the production of closed and 
binding ties and norms, the creation of mistrust and non-cooperation, and the 
reproduction of conformity, amongst others.  
 
A common theme running through the criticisms of social capital is the perpetuation 
of privilege, as described by Bourdieu (1977, 1986) in terms of those individuals 
using their links to other privileged people to maintain their status – an elite bunch of 
Jones‘s with their own symbols, norms and narratives of what constitutes the 
acceptable ‗in group‘ and its behaviour. While social capital in its positive forms is 
seen to produce optimal outcomes through the generation of norms, responsibilities 
and relationships so typical of the ethic of care literature, and that thus enable 
collective and individual action, the dark side criticisms see how this can be abused 
from a justice perspective. 
 
The departure from the ‗prevailing‘ emphasis on an ethic of justice is commonly 
attributed to Carol Gilligan (1982), whose book In a Different Voice (1982) argued 
that females tend to view morality in terms of interconnectedness, focusing not on  
fairness, autonomy or universal principles, but on the creation and strengthening of 
relationships among individuals and their attendant responsibilities: ―An ethic of care 
is reflected in concern about how to fulfil conflicting responsibilities to different 
people, as opposed to questions of how to resolve claims of conflicting rights among 
them‖ (Simola 2003, 354). 
 
This ties in very closely with approaches to social capital, which view one of its core 
motives as the willingness of individuals to look beyond their own self-interest and, 
based on sympathy and caring, help those with whom they have an affinity (Schmid 
2002).  The sympathy of an individual or group towards another individual or group 
―may produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for another 
person or group beyond that expected in an exchange relationship. Social capital 
resides in transacting, communicating individuals‖ (Schmid 2002, 750).   
 
Gray et al. (2007) examined gendered and racial exclusion in the workplace enacted 
through micro-level exclusionary ‗social capital‘ practices such as casual 
conversations, sporting activities, patronage by those higher up to help the next 
generation coming through and so on.  These activities result in negative norm-
generating ‗cliques‘, with trust extended through relationships amongst ‗insiders‘, 
who are defined by in-group values and narratives to the detriment of outsiders. They 
emphasise Marsden‘s (1987) findings of social homogeneity, which mean we seek 
similarity amongst those with whom we establish relationships according to criteria 
such as leisure pursuits, age, occupation, attitudes, family circumstances, location, etc.  
Therefore, when developing networks and sponsoring future careers, those in 
powerful positions will reproduce ‗homosocially‘ (Kanter 1977), that is, with those 
sharing their own characteristics.  
 
As a result:  ―Social networks function to enable access to information and knowledge 
and to create job opportunities, but at the same time, function to prevent others from 
gaining access to such privileges‖ (Gray et al. 2007, 145). This they argue is the key 
to understanding inequality in occupations; the supposed fair and objective processes 
of promotion and career advancement (in line with the prevailing justice orientation) 
are undermined by the preferences of powerful individuals who determine fitness for 
purpose of a candidate (based on relationships). This is very reminiscent of Lin‘s ‗it‘s 
not what you know, but who you know‘ commentary on social capital. The losers in 
this process tend to be women and minority groups (we would add the disadvantaged 
or poor also), who are an example of ‗some people‘s social capital being more useful 
than others‘. Their networks tend to be with individuals with whom they share certain 
characteristics with, and who are in a similarly disadvantaged position through, for 
example, poor access to information and knowledge networks, or low-ranking 
occupational areas. In such a process, social capital is not only a basis for inequality 
and the extension of privilege, but perpetuates it (Field 2003). 
 
The findings of Gray et al. (2007) show a less ‗rosy‘ version of the social capital story 
being ―about how social networks provide resources to lower-level aggregates—
organizations within societies, units within organizations, and individuals within 
units—with which the lower-level aggregates can reshape the higher-level aggregates 
and renegotiate their place within them‖ (Adler and Kwon 2002). On the contrary, 
within these networks of relationships, norms and outcomes are leveled downwards. 
As Portes and Landholdt (1996) explain, in competitive environments, any kind of 
information may be diffused according to political motives, and one person's social 
capital advantage may well mean another person's loss.  
 
In terms of racial exclusion, Putnam considers whether social capital is contrary to 
equality, in particular noting that: ―Race is the most important embodiment of the 
ethical crosscurrents that swirl around the rocks of social capital in contemporary 
America‖ (2000, 361). Discrimination in whatever form can come as a consequence 
of social capital, and the exclusion of those outside a well-bonded group or network is 
perhaps social capital‘s most clear-cut dark side. On the other side of the race issue, 
there have been some studies (see, for example, Flap et al.  2000, above) looking at 
the operation of social capital and ethnic minority businesses. Examples from family 
businesses, typically built around strong bonding social capital, suggest that children 
and relatives of the owner-manager often have little choice but to participate, a clear 
restriction on their liberty and freedom of choice, since livelihood and family life are 
intertwined (Ram and Jones 2002, 161). 
 
The perpetuation of privilege and inequality is often examined in terms of managerial 
careers. It is unclear whether Burt (1997) and Granovetter (1973) were aware of the 
potential moral deficiencies of social capital as a way of enhancing managerial careers 
through increasing such individuals‘ status at the expense of others (Field 2003). The 
networking manager may be the most well-connected, but may not be the best person 
for the job and will be adept at using their relationships to advance their own interests 
and viewpoints; the organisation may suffer as a result.  
 
Again, this phenomenon has also been commented on in relation to knowledge-
sharing, and the potentially high degree of selectivity in its enactment. Not only are 
the powerful selective in what and with whom they share knowledge, excluding some 
and including others, but those in the network may find their freedom limited in terms 
of acceptable behaviour, obligations to key parties, and their abilities to exercise 
independent thought and knowledge development. This leads to the creation of a 
‗social prison‘ (Portes 1998, in Willem and Scarbrough 2006), and external 
knowledge may be rejected or excluded as suspicious and untrustworthy (Adler and 
Kwon 2002). As pointed out previously on utilitarianism, the goals and biases of the 
closely connected subgroup may then come to dominate the whole organisation. 
 
As the foregoing shows, justice-based concerns over liberty and freedom are a key 
criticism of communities who generate norms and obligations that those within them 
are committed to, and indeed which members will be loathe to break, for fear of 
becoming an outsider. Coleman‘s famous example of the diamond traders in New 
York shows the positive outcomes of a community that aspires to honesty amongst its 
members. However, for individuals in difficulties or who disagree or who are 
beholden to onerous obligations, their freedom to act independently, or be honest with 
their peers may be curtailed despite their best intentions.  
 Flap et al. (2000, 155), examining the social capital of entrepreneurs in the 
Netherlands, suggest that a very dense network of bonding social capital makes it 
undesirable, even impossible, for the entrepreneur to be honest in times of difficulty. 
Entrepreneurs may ―hide the true state of their affairs out of fear of damaging their 
reputation and ruining their chance of selling their business and goodwill‖. The close 
watch of a community can thus force dishonest behaviour.  If repeated, such forceful 
acts of dishonesty may reduce the honesty of a person‘s character. This runs contrary 
to the suggestion by those in favour of such networks, for example, Brass et al. 
(1998), who argue that the stronger the ties holding a group together, the greater the 
incentive for ethical behaviour since there is an expectation of future interaction – 
typical of care-based approaches to business. They consider that the multiplexity of 
relations, where there is a high degree of appropriability, will result in ethical 
behaviour. This again runs counter to Flap et al‘s argument that tightly knit groups 
high in social capital may be driven to unethical behaviour due to the sheer pressure 
of group norms and relationships, and the unacceptability of failure as defined by the 
group.  
 
Therefore, groups characterised by strong interdependent relationships can put 
enormous strain on individuals, if they ‗fail‘ in reaching the group norms, do not 
comply with their presumed characteristics and are perceived not to fulfil their 
‗proper‘ obligations. For example, Katila (2002, 190) talks of farms in Finland and 
notes that ―When a farmer takes over the farm from the previous generation he 
immediately commits himself to the values of the yeoman moral order as well…He is 
responsible not only to himself but also to the previous generations. Breaking the 
chain of continuation means that one is wasting all the years of labour invested in the 
farm business.‖ In Finland, to inherit and then lose the family farm would bring guilt 
and shame on the perpetrator and his (and it normally is a male‘s) family. This is not 
an intentionally unkind norm, indeed no doubt the community feel they have 
extraordinarily high moral standards, but could lead to psychological strain for those 
not able to live to the ‗standard‘. This community also demonstrates one of the 
enduring features of long-standing, tight-knit communities, that of highly gendered 
expectations with a clear prescription of men and women‘s work (Katila 2002, 191). 
Clearly, such norms are not concomitant with freedom of choice, but do resonate 





This article provides ―some balance to the frequently celebratory tone with which the 
concept [of social capital] is surrounded‖ (Portes 1998, 3) by re-examining the social 
capital literature from an ethics perspective. Whereas previous commentators have 
tended to draw on a variety of risks associated with social capital to highlight its ‗dark 
side‘, our critique exposes discussions of the rationale, operation and criticisms of 
social capital to the language of ethical theory.  Debate over social capital‘s operation 
and the criticisms of it are in fact typical of the ethics debate over the difference 
between perspectives based on autonomous individual rights, as set out in the 
prevalent justice perspective, and Gilligan‘s (1982) criticism of this approach based 
on a ‗different voice‘ that emphasises the importance of relationships. This tension is 
realized in the argument that the ethic of care perspective has been linked to ‗negative 
freedom‘, in the sense of standing in the way of a free or autonomous life, which is of 
course the highest aim of a justice orientation (Giddens 1998, cited in Sevenhuijsen 
2000). Under this argument, bonds become bondage. 
 
Portes (1998) has criticised social capital over its potential for exclusion, loss of 
individual freedom, insularity and excessive obligations. The trust and cooperation 
engendered through the focal group and its actors, while popularly seen as delivering 
positive outcomes, in reality have the potential to translate into a mistrust of outsiders 
and the generation of downwardly mobile group norms that discourage external 
cooperation and encourage selectivity and abuse. From an ethical perspective, social 
capital is both achieving and risking the utilitarian benefit of economic and societal 
prosperity through an unequal distribution of justice-based fairness and equal rights 
amongst certain members of the community who are bound by restrictive 
relationships and power imbalances.  However, the utilitarian perspective, with its 
focus on aggregate welfare, may well trample individual needs and rights, leading to 
another tension in the ethics literature, as: ―Differing perspectives subordinate 
individual liberty to the primacy of the common good (Etzioni 1999) or call for 
individual liberty as the overriding principle (Friedman 1970)‖ (Spence and 
Schmidpeter 2003, 94). 
 
Putnam himself has drawn this out, conceding the disadvantages of strong 
communities restricting freedom and promoting intolerance. As he admits without 
further comment in a brief aside  (2000, 21-22): ―Networks, and the associated norms 
of reciprocity are generally good for those inside the network, but the external effects 
of social capital are by no means always positive….Therefore it is important to ask 
how the positive consequences of social capital – mutual support, cooperation, trust, 
institutional effectiveness – can be maximized and the negative manifestations – 
sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption – minimized‖.  
 
This tension between ‗positive consequences‘ rooted in notions of relationships and 
responsibilities towards the other and the ‗negative manifestations‘ of elitism, 
insularity and corruption are closely tied to arguments over the ethic of care 
perspective that perceives ethical dilemmas ―as conflicts of responsibilities in 
relationships rather than conflicts of rights between individuals‖ (Crane and Matten 
2007, 112), compared with justice-based concerns over restrictions on freedom and 
inequality of power and status. While relationships are put at the centre of the ethic of 
care that sees them as crucial to properly understanding ethical decision making, 
Portes‘ (1998) and Putnam‘s (2000) ‗dark side‘ discussions of their abuse in social 
capital terms are echoed in the ethics literature in terms of justice-based critiques of 
the care ethic. Communal discourses that are distorted and controlled by powerful 
agents are seen as subverting the goals of an ethic of responsibility (Niebuhr 1963 in 
Dillard 2001). The focal actor is bound through these community-based restrictions, 
and must be liberated through autonomy, as enacted through justice. 
 
Often, the caring dimension of social capital is neglected; in particular when 
highlighting the appropriability of social capital, personal relationships are seen as an 
asset of potential value to business or other instrumental causes. This suggests the 
instrumentalisation of relationships to bringing positive consequences in spheres 
outside of personal life. The pursuit of social capital may over-ride the pursuit of 
personal relationships for their own sake. Social capital has been found to bring 
benefits to individuals who operate successfully with it. However, the very value of 
social capital may be derived from a devaluation of friendship and kinship. Trying to 
build goodwill by cultivating friendship may be thwarted if the motivation is 
disingenuous (Perry 1999, 15). 
 
As a result, an instrumental, utility-inspired approach to social capital entails the risk 
that social relationships based on care dissolve into a ‗marketplace of contacts‘, where 
everyone instrumentalises everyone else. Even if this is all based on informed mutual 
consent, an important moral value may be jeopardised, namely our ability to engage 
in special relationships involving care.  
 
It is our contention that the literature on social capital is strengthened by this ethical 
review which fortifies our critical understanding of the concept. Future research and 
management application of social capital should be done with the ethics perspective in 
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